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Abstract
A major concern regarding the study of narratives regards how they are indexed and retrieved.
This is a question which touches on the structure of human memory in general. Indeed, if
narratives capture the substance of human thought, then data that we have already collected
regarding human memory is of central importance to the computational study of narrative. Fuzzy
Trace Theory assumes that memory for narrative is simultaneously stored at multiple levels
of abstraction and, whenever possible, decision-makers interpret a stimulus qualitatively and
therefore operate on a simple – typically categorical – “gist” representation. Here, we present
a computational model of Fuzzy Trace Theory applied to explain the impact of changes in a
narrative upon risky-choice framing effects. Overall, our theory predicts the outcome of 20
experimental effects using only three basic assumptions: 1) preference for lowest level of gist, that
is, categorical processing; 2) decision options that fall within the same categorical description are
then interpreted using finer-grained (ordinal or verbatim) distinctions; and 3) once the options
are mentally represented, decision preferences are generated on the basis of simple positive vs.
negative valences stored in long-term memory (e.g., positive value for human lives). A fourth
assumption – that negatively-valenced decision options are preferentially converted to positive
decision options – is used when categories are not otherwise comparable.
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1 How Are Narratives Stored in Memory?
Narratives entail sequences of events that must be both recalled from the narrator’s memory
and stored in the memory of the audience. It has long been known that narratives are
not only recalled, nor stored, in a verbatim manner – rather, memory for narratives tends
to favor events that are central to the story’s causal structure [17, 18] – i.e., events that
communicate the narrative’s meaning to its audience. For example, Dehghani et al. [4] have
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shown that changes in a narrative’s surface form did not change how subjects responded to a
questionnaire about how the narrative’s main character was expected to respond, whereas
changes in the narrative’s underlying structure did lead to a change in the expected behavior
of the main character. Dehghani et al. argue that changes in the narrative’s surface form lead
subjects to make inferences based on analogy with the original narrative, whereas changes
in the underlying structure of the narrative preclude such an analogy from forming. Such
observations motivate our research question: How are narratives stored in, and recalled from,
memory?
2 Is Memory Schematic?
Modern psychological theories of memory storage and retrieval may be broadly classified
into two categories: schema theories and association theories, both of which are widely
found throughout the artificial intelligence (AI) and psychology literatures [7, 15]. Schema
theories posit the existence of a schema or frame that is used to structure memory and
experience such that what is recalled is coherent and confirms existing expectations. Such
schemata are typically generated through repeated experience and may be part and parcel
of membership within a given culture, domain of expertise, or any other situation in which
frequent exposure to a set of regularities drives future expectations in a structured way.
Schema, once formed, can drive perception and explanation, and may therefore be said to
have an existence that is independent of the world features with which they interact. In
contrast, association theories, assume that meaning emerges from co-occurrence patterns
among world feature. Whereas schema models posit a higher-level data structure which
guides surface feature recognition and interpretation, association models posit a bottom-up
approach whereby surface feature co-occurrence drives meaning. In their classic paper,
Alba and Hasher [1] synthesized evidence demonstrating that memory, although possessing
several features of schematic representation, nevertheless also was strongly affected by surface
form. In fact, that literature review documented robust but contradictory findings from
these alternative theoretical perspectives. Empirical research suggests that elements of the
schema and associationist models are both correct [13]. For example, phenomena such
as false recognition, where “false” memories that are consistent with a given schema are
recalled, support schema theory. On the other hand, phenomena such as false recognition
reversal (higher levels of rejection for schema-consistent recognition items), have also been
observed, supporting the recall of surface form. These contradictory findings have led to the
development of “Fuzzy Trace Theory” (FTT) – a theory of memory for narrative that posits
the simultaneous existence, and encoding, of two types of memory. Verbatim memory is
memory for surface form and is typically detailed, yet brittle (i.e., quick to fade). Verbatim
memory might include the specific words used in the telling of a narrative. On the other
hand, FTT also posits the existence of gist memory, which captures the essential (often
schema-consistent) meaning of a stimulus.
3 The Asian Disease Problem as a Testbed for Narrative Memory
The difference between gist and verbatim may be explained using a classic decision problem
due to Tversky and Kahneman, known as the Asian Disease Problem (ADP) [19, 20], which
is accompanied by the following pair of narratives: Assume that 600 people are expected to
die from an outbreak of disease. You have a choice between two programs to combat the
disease: (a) 200 people will be saved versus (b) a 1/3 probability that 600 people will be
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saved and a 2/3 probability that no one will be saved. The “people saved” version of the
problem is described in terms of gains relative to a reference point of 0. The “people die”
version of the same problem is: Assume that 600 people are expected to die from an outbreak
of disease. You have a choice between two programs to combat the disease: (a) 400 people
will die versus (b) a 2/3 probability that 600 people will die and a 1/3 probability that no
one will die. This problem has been used to highlight a framing effect, which refers to the
typical result that most people prefer the certain option in the gain frame, but they prefer
the risky option (gamble) in the loss frame. FTT holds that the narrative described above is
simultaneously encoded on two levels: gist and verbatim. The verbatim level behaves in a
manner similar to traditional economic theory, whereby a comparison is made between two
options of equal expected value, as follows:
(a) 200 people will be saved = 200 saved vs.
(b) 1/3 * (600) people will be saved = 200 saved
In contrast, the gist level represents the core meaning of each of the decision options.
Thus, a representation of the above problem at the gist level might be:
(a) Some are saved vs.
(b) Maybe some are saved or maybe none are saved
This would lead a decision-maker to choose option a, consistent with empirical findings.
Similarly, the gist of the negatively-framed alternative might be:
(d) Some die vs.
(e) Maybe some die or maybe none die
This framing would lead a decision-maker to choose option b, also consistent with
empirical findings. Importantly, gist and verbatim interpretations are recorded in parallel –
i.e., gist is not derived from a verbatim representation [13]. Furthermore, several levels of
gist can exist, such as at the level of the word, the sentence, the paragraph, or the entire
narrative. We are able to use the concepts of gist and verbatim to replicate the findings of
20 separate experiments from the psychology literature. These effects are the consequences
of the following four assumptions:
1. preference for categorical representations that are simultaneously the most meaningful
and least detailed
2. decision options that fall within the same categorical description are then interpreted
using finer-grained (ordinal or verbatim) distinctions
3. once the options are mentally represented, decision preferences are generated on the basis
of simple positive vs. negative valences stored in long-term memory (e.g., positive value
for human lives).
4. negatively-valenced decision options are preferentially converted to positive decision
options –when categories are not otherwise comparable. Following is a computational
implementation of a risky decision-making problem of the sort outlined above, meant to
further clarify the distinction between gist and verbatim.
Our computational model has the following elements:
1. Configuration space: A narrative must occur within a given context – what is known in
literary theory as a small world [5]. In the case of our decision-making problem outlined
above, we posit the existence of a configuration space [6], which serves as the contextual
CMN 2013
46 Gist and Verbatim in Narratives
create_configuration_space(num_dimensions , special_points)
for i=1: num_decision_alternatives
category(i) = find_category(decision_alternative(i))
end
for i=1: total_decision_alternative_pairs
representation = categorical_representation(i)
if~( categories_comparable)
representation = convert_negative_to_positive(i)
end
while(representation ~= verbatim_representation(i))
if(dominant_category_exists)
return dominant_option
else
representation =
add_precision(representation)
end
end
end
Listing 1 FTT Pseudocode.
grounding for our decision. In our context, a configuration space is a mathematical
formalization of the universe of possible decisions that might be made. For example, for
the ADP, there are two types of numbers that a decision-maker is required to understand.
The first represents the number of people who are saved, and the second represents
the probability with which the first number occurs. This may be represented as a 2-
dimensional space, where one axis (ranging from 0 to 600) represents the number of
people who might be saved under the different treatment conditions and the other axis
(ranging from 0 to 1) represents the probability of success in the gamble option. Each
decision option complement represents a point in this space. For example, the certain
option is located at (200, 1) because there is a certain probability that 200 people will be
saved. The non-zero complement of the gamble option is located at (600, 1/3) since there
is a 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved. Finally, the zero complement of the
gamble option is located at (0, 2/3) since there is a 2/3 probability that 0 people will be
saved under the gamble option.
2. Special points: We may subject points in the configuration space to certain constraints.
Restricting points to a subset of this space reflects one such constraint. A concrete
example of such a restriction might be that the total number of people saved equals zero
which restricts all points to be on the vertical axis (i.e., the line x = 0). This corresponds
to the statement “none are saved”. Another example might be the horizontal line defined
by the equation y = 1, corresponding to a certain outcome. Further, Feldman observes
that constraints of this type are highly improbable by chance alone – i.e., a point chosen
at random from the configuration space is highly unlikely to satisfy the constraint by
accident. These values are associated with qualitatively different categories: an event
happens or not, is certain versus uncertain, or is impossible versus possible. Thus, none
saved (x = 0) is likely to be salient. All (x = 600) saved may be salient if it is made clear
in the problem definition that 600 represents the entire population (therefore all are saved;
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Figure 1 An example of a 2-dimensional configuration space for the Asian Disease Problem. Each
point represents a decision complement.
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Figure 2 A 2-dimensional configuration space with 1-dimensional restrictions defined by the
lines x = 0 and y = 0 (heavy dashed lines). The likelihood that a randomly chosen point in this
2-dimensional space will fall on either of these lines approaches 0.
see below). As noted above, the constraints that are salient in the configuration space are
determined by biological, psychological, or socio-cultural factors. Given a configuration
space, certain points within this space are psychologically special (or “non-accidental”
see, e.g., [8]), and are therefore categorically different than other points in the space. In
the ADP, “none saved” or “none die” are special points because they are categorically
different from “some saved”, or “some die”. In this way, these special points define a set
of categories in the configuration space. Although, formally, “0 die” is still part of the
closed interval containing the “die” axis, and is therefore contained within the “some
die category”, it is preferentially interpreted by the most restrictive category available,
consistent with Feldman’s genericity principle. These categories therefore define a partial
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order over categories that may be thought of as a perception lattice [6]. For example,
Kasturirangan [10] has proposed a narrative interpretation of non-accidental points
whereby narrative contexts change whenever characters in a story encounter conflicts,
which are non-accidental features in his framework.
3. Values: Given a pair of categories, one is either strictly preferred to the other, or they
are unrelated. Such values allow a decision-maker to choose between these categories.
For example, “some live” is preferred to “none live”, whereas “none die” is preferred to
“some die”.
According to FTT, gist-level processing is preferred, explaining the framing effects observed
by Tversky and Kahneman [19, 20]. This model has been implemented in GNU/OCTAVE
and faithfully replicates 20 different experimental effects, including truncated and expanded
versions of the ADP, and frequently-observed outcomes in the Allais paradox [2]. In each of
these cases, minor changes in the narrative describing a decision-situation can lead to large
changes in the decision outcome.
4 The 20 Effects Predicted
Our model has been tested against, and successfully predicts, the outcomes of the 20
experiments listed in the following table:
Decision Data
Effect Stimulus Gist Representation Outcome Source
1 200 saved vs. some saved vs. A [19]
1/3 chance 600 saved OR
2/3 chance none saved
some chance some saved OR
some chance none saved
2 400 die vs. some die vs. [19]
1/3 chance none die OR
2/3 chance 600 die
some chance none die OR
some chance some die
B
3 200 saved AND 400 not
saved vs.
some saved AND some not
saved vs.
Indifference [11, 16, 3]
1/3 chance 600 saved OR
2/3 chance none saved
some chance some saved OR
some chance none saved
4 400 die AND 200 do not
die vs.
some die AND some do not
die vs.
Indifference [11, 16, 3]
1/3 chance none die OR
2/3 chance 600 die
some chance none die OR
some chance some die
5 400 not saved vs. some not saved vs. [11]
1/3 chance 600 saved OR
2/3 chance none saved
some chance some saved OR
some chance none saved
B
6 200 do not die vs. some do not die vs. A [11]
1/3 chance none die OR
2/3 chance 600 die
some chance none die OR
some chance some die
7 200 saved vs. some saved vs. Indifference [14, 16, 12]
1/3 chance 600 saved some chance some saved
8 400 die vs. some die vs. Indifference [14, 16, 12]
2/3 chance 600 die some chance some die
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9 200 saved vs. some saved vs. A [14, 12]
2/3 chance none saved some chance none saved
10 400 die vs. some die vs. [14, 12]
1/3 chance none die some chance none die B
11 200 saved vs. some saved vs. A [14]
2/3 chance 600 die some chance some die
12 400 die vs. some die vs. [14]
1/3 chance 600 saved some chance some saved B
13 200 saved vs. some saved vs. Indifference [14]
1/3 chance none die some chance some saved
14 400 die vs. some saved vs. A [14]
2/3 chance none saved some chance none saved
15 200 saved vs. some saved vs. A [14]
1/3 chance none die OR
2/3 chance 600 die
some chance some saved OR
some chance none saved
16 400 die vs. some saved vs. A [14]
1/3 chance 600 saved OR
2/3 chance none saved
some chance some saved OR
some chance none saved
17 1m dollars with certainty some money with certainty A [2]
1m dollars with 0.89
chance OR Nothing with
0.01 chance OR 5m dol-
lars with 0.10 chance
some money with some
chance OR no money with
some chance OR some money
with some chance
18 Nothing with 0.89 chance
OR 1m dollars with 0.11
chance
no money with some chance
OR less money with some
chance
[2]
Nothing with 0.90 chance
OR 5m dollars with 0.10
chance
no money with some chance
OR more money with maybe
B
19 200 saved vs. some saved vs. Indifference [22, 21, 9]
1/3 chance all 600 saved
OR 2/3 chance none
saved
maybe all saved OR maybe
none saved
20 400 die vs. some die vs. Indifference [22, 21, 9]
1/3 chance none die OR
2/3 chance all 600 die
maybe none die OR maybe
all die
Each of these effects is representative of a class of decision problems that share a similar
structure.
5 Discussion
We began this paper by asking how narratives are stored in, and retrieved from, human
memory. In order to answer this question computationally, we take steps towards formalizing
Fuzzy Trace Theory – a theory of human memory. Although we focus on decision problems
for tractability, the more general concepts of gist and verbatim representation are applicable
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to the study of narrative. Furthermore, decision problems are particularly relevant to the
computational modeling of narrative because they entail short narratives that set up the
decision situation. Minor changes in the way these narratives are framed can have major
impacts on the ultimate decision made. We argue that this is central to the computational
modeling of narrative because understanding may depend significantly on how a narrative is
framed. Future work will focus on extending our formalization beyond the domain of the
simple decision problems to more complex accounts of false memory and narrative structure.
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